Bhikkhu Bodhi: If one's aim in following the Dhamma is to gain release from existential anxiety, than the tree-life interpretation of dependent arising may be seen unsatisfactory and one may turn to Ven Nanavira's version as more adequate. But the task the Buddha sets before his disciples is of a different nature: namely, to gain liberation from the recurrent cycle of birth, old age, and death, that is from bondage to samsara.

Bhikkhu Bodhi overlooks very important point, release from existential anxiety and liberation from the recurrent cycle of birth, old age, and death, that is from bondage to samsara is gained by the very same cessation of conceit "I am". And exactly with this problem deal both Ven Nanamoli and Ven Nanavira in their expositions of dependent arising.

"So he has this seeing and he has also this attitude "I am", but as long as there is the attitude "I am" there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue and body (S 22:47)". (For cessation of mental anxiety see D 33 or A 6. 13)

But where exactly the Buddha in his dependent arising directly deals with the problem of conceit "I am"?

'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this creature come from? Where is it bound?'

Am I? Am I not? This way I ask myself about my being, being which I take for granted. The Buddha out of compassion describes my experience in his dependent arising. As long as I do not see dependent arising, due to ignorance I do ask questions about my being. In order to stop ask such question, I have to see dependent arising, of which being - bhava is a member. With such knowledge there is no more questions about my being.

"When a disciple of the noble ones has seen well with right discernment this dependent co-arising & these dependently co-arisen phenomena as they have come to be, it is not possible that he would run after the past, thinking, 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past?' or that he would run after the future, thinking, 'Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' or that he would be inwardly perplexed about the immediate present, thinking, 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?' Such a thing is not possible. Why is that? Because the disciple of the noble ones has seen well with right discernment this dependent co-arising & these dependently co-arisen phenomena as they have come to be." SN 12: 20

But upon what condition depends my being?
 
Upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā jāti; jātipaccayā jarāmaranam...
 
With holding as condition, being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing-&-death...
The fundamental upādāna or 'holding' is attavāda (see Majjhima ii,1 ), which is holding a belief in 'self'. The puthujjana takes what appears to be his 'self' at its face value; and so long as this goes on he continues to be a 'self', at least in his own eyes (and in those of others like him). This is bhava or 'being'. The puthujjana knows that people are born and die; and since he thinks 'my self exists' so he also thinks 'my self was born' and 'my self will die'. The puthujjana sees a 'self' to whom the words birth and death apply. In contrast to the puthujjana, the arahat has altogether got rid of asmimāna (not to speak of attavāda— and does not even think 'I am'. This is bhavanirodha, cessation of being. And since he does not think 'I am' he also does not think 'I was born' or 'I shall die'. In other words, he sees no 'self' or even 'I' for the words birth and death to apply to. This is jātinirodha and jarāmarananirodha. (…) The puthujjana, taking his apparent 'self' at face value, does not see that he is a victim of upādāna; he does not see that 'being a self' depends upon 'holding a belief in self' (upādānapaccayā bhavo); and he does not see that birth and death depend upon his 'being a self' (bhavapaccayā jāti, and so on). The ariyasāvaka, on the other hand, does see these things, and he sees also their cessation (even though he may not yet have fully realized it); and his seeing of these things is direct. Nanavira Thera

Nibbana is cessation of being now and here; and with cessation of being, cessation of birth, with cessation of birth cessation of death. This ariyan knowledge can be communicated more o less directly:

Nanamoli Thera: In a syllogism (1. All man are mortal 2. Socrates is a man 3. Therefore Socrates is mortal) the generalization (all man are mortal) must have been arrived at by induction. No inductive process is ever absolutely certain. There always is the lap, the assumption, of generalizing and therefore one of the premises of a syllogism must have an element of uncertainty. So it cannot prove anything with certainty.
A syllogism is therefore a signpost pointing where to look for direct experience, but can inherently never give information that is 100% certain. But a syllogism (on metaphysical subjects) can also point out to what can inherently never be experienced; than it is an anomaly.

All the question about death are wrongly put.

Nisargadatta Maharaj: I am told I was born. I do not remember. I am told I shall die. I do not expect it. You tell me I have forgotten or I lack imagination. But I just cannot remember what never happened nor I expect the patently impossible. Bodies are born and bodies die, but what is it to me?

Those who claim to have selected their father and mother and decided how they are going to live their next life may know for themselves. I know for myself. I never was born.

Wei wu wei: Who could there be to be born, to be lived, to be killed?
What could there be to be brought into existence or to be taken out of existence?
Where could there be a 'space' in which objective existence could be extended?
When could there be a 'time' during which objective existence could have duration?
These notions, so queried, belong to whoever has never profoundly considered these facile and conditioned assumptions, for all are conceptual images in mind, the supposed factuality of which is as imaginary as any mirage, hallucination, or dream, and all of which are experienced as both factual and actual.
But the supreme illusion is not that of the incidence of 'birth', 'life', and 'death' as such, but that of there being any objective entity to experience these conceptual occurrences.
The accessory illusion is that of spatial and temporal extension subject to which the supreme illusion of entity is rendered possible and without which no 'entity' could appear to suffer any experience whatever.

Being, birth, death all are members of dependent arising and as such are impermanent, determined and dependently arisen. All of them depend on ignorance. Nanananda Bhikkhu:

Why is ignorance given as the first link in the formula of dependent arising? It is because the entire series is dependent on ignorance. It is not a temporal sequence. it does not involve time. That is why the Dhamma is called timeless, akalika. it is the stereotype interpretation of the formula of dependent arising in therms of three lives that undermined the immediate and timeless quality of the Dhamma. Since ignorance is the root cause of all other conditions inclusive of existence (bhava), birth (jati) and decay-and-death (jaramaranam) that state of affairs immediately ceases with the cessation of ignorance.

Summary

Ajhan Brahmavamso : Arahants experience suffering, because all existence (bhava) or birth (jati) or death is suffering. Only when they pass away, or “parannibana” when existence ceases, does suffering end once and for all.

We see that Ven Brahmavamso is under influence of personality view, for him arahat is a person who was born - here we have identification with a body - that is why end of suffering according to Ven Brahmavamso can happen only after death of a body. In terms of Four Noble Truths Ajahan Brahmavamso does not see that conceit I am = suffering and cessation of conceit I am = cessation of suffering.

Nanananda Bhikkhu: All other religious teachers were concern with the salvation of real “I” or in other words to confer immortality on this “I”. The Buddha on the contrary, declared that what actually “is” there, is a conceit – the conceit “am”. All what is necessary is the dispelling of this conceit (one arrives at the eradication of the conceit “am” which in itself is the attainment of nibbana here and know -A 4.353 Sambhodhi Sutta)

"'He has been stilled where the currents of construing do not flow. And when the currents of construing do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.' Thus it was said. With reference to what was it said? 'I am' is a construing. 'I am this' is a construing. 'I shall be' is a construing. 'I shall not be'...'I shall be possessed of form'...'I shall not be possessed of form'...'I shall be percipient'...'I shall not be percipient'...'I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient' is a construing. Construing is a disease, construing is a cancer, construing is an arrow. By going beyond all construing, he is called a sage at peace.
"Furthermore, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die, is unagitated, and is free from longing. He has nothing whereby he would be born. Not being born, will he age? Not aging, will he die? Not dying, will he be agitated? Not being agitated, for what will he long?
M 140

Nanavira Thera: While maintaining the necessary reservations about his views, we may observe that Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit (Halle 1927, p.374), subordinates the ideas of birth and death to that of being, within the unity of our existential structure. I exist, I am, as born; and, as born, I am as liable at every moment to die.